



# San Diego County Sheriff's Department

Post Office Box 939062 • San Diego, California 92193-9062



William B. Kolender, Sheriff

Barry R. Zuniga, Undersheriff

July 11, 2005

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Honorable John S. Einhorn  
Presiding Judge, San Diego Superior Court  
County Courthouse  
220 West Broadway  
San Diego, CA 92101

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SAN DIEGO  
COUNTY GRAND JURY

Dear Judge Einhorn,

**Response to the San Diego County Grand Jury's June 15, 2005 report**  
**"Arrested in San Diego County"**

Pursuant to California Penal Code Section 933, the following is my response to the Grand Jury's findings and recommendations 05-41 through 05-46.

Las Colinas Detention Facility:

Grand Jury Finding

- The Las Colinas Detention Facility does not provide adequate fire protection in all inmate living areas.

Our Response:

We disagree with this finding. On June 30, 2004, the Fire Department conducted the annual fire inspection as per the mandate of Section 13146.1, California Health and Safety Code and applicable requirements of Titles 19 and 24, California Code of Regulations at Las Colinas. No deficiencies affecting fire or life safety were noted.

In December of 2003, in accordance with Title 25 requirements, the Board of Corrections completed the bi-annual inspection. In Section 1032, Fire Suppression Preplanning, Las Colinas Detentions Facility met the criteria in all five of the rated sections. As such, we believe that the fire protection meets all the requirements and is adequate.

Grand Jury Recommendation:

05-42 In the Las Colinas Detention Facility, install sprinklers in all inmate-housing areas.

Our Response:

05-42 This recommendation will not be implemented because the Las Colinas Detention Facility meets all of the requirements as is. Rather than adding expensive retrofitting we believe that our continued efforts toward building a new Las Colinas Women's facility will better serve the public and be a wiser use of public funds.

Grand Jury Finding:

- The Las Colinas Detention Facility does not provide adequate protection for the sworn and civilian staff working behind the counter in the lobby.

Our Response:

We disagree with this finding from the standpoint that we believe that the protection at Las Colinas is adequate. We do, however, believe that it could be improved and we are examining the possibility of adding bullet-proof glass and security pass-through drawers. We are attempting to locate funding for this project.

Grand Jury Recommendation:

05-41 In the Las Colinas Detention Facility, install a protective barrier with a secure sliding drawer to receive paperwork and documents between visitors and the sworn and civilian staff working behind the counter in the lobby.

Our Response:

05-41 We agree that this recommendation would improve safety and security at the public counter. This recommendation will be implemented as soon as funding can be identified, construction contracts let and the work can be finished.

George Bailey Detention Facility:

Grand Jury Finding:

- All cells at the George F. Bailey and Vista Detention Facilities are not secure from unauthorized inmate exit.

Our Response:

We agree with this finding. However we believe that it is important for the public to know that the doors in question lead only from the inmates' cells into common inmate living areas. These doors do not lead into secured hallways or into public areas and certainly do not exit the secure facilities.

Grand Jury Recommendation:

- 05-43 In the George Bailey Detention Facility, replace or repair existing cell doors to prevent unauthorized exit by inmates.

Our Response:

05-43 We have been in the process of implementing this recommendation. At the George Bailey Detention Facility there are over 400 doors that have needed lock kit replacements. This year we have allocated \$50,000 to purchase about 250 retrofit kits. We will continue to retrofit the cell doors until the project is completed. Again, we believe that it is important for the public to know that the doors in question lead only from the inmates' cells into common inmate living areas. These doors do not lead into secured hallways or into public areas and certainly do not exit the secure facilities.

Vista Detention Facility:

Grand Jury Finding:

- All cells at the George F. Bailey and Vista Detention Facilities are not secure from unauthorized inmate exit.

Our Response:

We agree with this finding. However we believe that it is important for the public to know that the doors in question lead only from the inmates' cells into common inmate living areas. These doors do not lead into secured hallways or into public areas and certainly do not exit the secure facilities.

Grand Jury Recommendation:

05-44 In the Vista Detention Facility, replace or repair existing cell doors to prevent unauthorized exit by inmates.

Our Response:

05-44 This recommendation is already in the process of being implemented. We are currently replacing the control panels in each of the housing modules, control and in areas throughout the Vista Detention Facility. As the control panels are replaced, especially in the modules, our maintenance engineers test the cell door locks in conjunction with the new panel. They then replace those locking mechanisms that are defective. We expect to complete this project by the end of calendar year 2005. Again, we believe that it is important for the public to know that the doors in question lead only from the inmates' cells into common inmate living areas. These doors do not lead into secured hallways or into public areas and certainly do not exit the secure facilities.

Poway Sheriff's Station:

Grand Jury Finding:

- Staff at the Poway Station are exposed to some safety risk.
- There is a risk of unauthorized inmate exit at the Poway Sheriff's Station.

Our Response:

We agree with both findings.

Grand Jury Recommendations:

- 05-45 Install a secured exit door nearest the holding cells to the outside of the building.
- 05-46 Install a secure door between the holding cell areas to the remainder of the building.

Our Response:

- 05-45 We intend to implement this recommendation by installing the Prox-card readers on the exterior exit door and to gain access to the adjacent Report room to prevent unauthorized egress from the building or into the Report room. Cost estimates not determined at this time. The recommended modifications have been reviewed by the Sheriff Management Services Division and will be prioritized along with other similar Major Maintenance projects in the following budget year.
- 05-46 We intend to install a Storefront type glass wall with security door and Prox-card reader to prevent unauthorized access to the rest of the Sheriff Station. Cost estimates not determined at this time. Again, the recommended modifications have been reviewed by the Sheriff Management Services Division and will be prioritized along with other similar Major Maintenance projects in the following budget year.

If the members of the Grand Jury need further clarification or additional discussion, please feel free to contact the Assistant Sheriff in charge of the Detention Services Bureau, Dennis Runyen at (858) 974-2278.

Sincerely,

  
William B. Kolender, Sheriff

WKB/bhr